



# Digital Certificates Principles of operation

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### **Digital Certificates**

- Types of certificates
- Roles of certificates (identity, server, security & authentication)
- How is a certificate associated with something
- What are all the fields
- How are they managed with RACF
- Problem solving techniques some scenarios and how to fix them with RACF commands
- How to set-up for the purpose of encrypting 3270 sessions, SSL sessions
- Discuss code from racf.co.uk

#### • X.509

- PKCS7 Cryptographic Message Syntax
- PKCS10 Certification Request Syntax
- PKCS11 Cryptographic Token Interface
- PKCS12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax

#### Vendor defined classes

VeriSign uses the concept of classes for different types of digital certificates:

- Class 1 for individuals, intended for email.
- Class 2 for organizations, for which proof of identity is required.
- Class 3 for servers and software signing, for which independent verification and checking of identity and authority is done by the issuing certificate authority.
- Class 4 for online business transactions between companies.
- Class 5 for private organizations or governmental security.


Other vendors may choose to use different classes or no classes at all as this is not specified in the PKI standards.

SSL and TLS certificates

http://www.rtfm.com/sslbook/







#### TÜRK TRUST

Topical example which is very much in the news



http://turktrust.com.tr/en/kamuoyu-aciklamasi-en.html

#### ASN.1

```
0 1341: SEQUENCE {
  4 1061:
            SEQUENCE {
              [0]
 8
       3:
 10
       1:
                INTEGER 2
 13
       2:
              INTEGER 2087
 17
              SEQUENCE {
      13:
 19
       9:
                OBJECT IDENTIFIER shalwithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 5)
 30
       0:
                NULL
     172:
              SEQUENCE {
 32
 35
      61:
                SET {
 37
      59:
                   SEQUENCE {
 39
     3:
                     OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
 44
      52:
                     UTF8String
                       'T..RKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikas.. Hizmet'
                       'leri'
 98
      11:
                SET {
100
       9:
                   SEQUENCE {
102
       3:
                     OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
107
       2:
                     PrintableString 'TR'
                SET {
111
      94:
```

### **Binary**

- 1 0, ENO=0, EOT % ETX STX SOH STX STX STX BS '0
- 2 ACK \*+H+-
- 3 SOHSOHENOENONULO-1=0; ACKERXUEONENXEE4TÜRKTRUST Elektronik Sunucu Sertifikası Hizmetleri1W10
  ACKERXUEONACKDESSTXTR1^0\ACKERXUEON
- 4 DOUTÜRKTRUST Bilgi İletiÅŸim ve BiliÅŸim GþvenliÄŸi Hizmetleri A.Åž. (c) Kasım 20050 SSDTB
- 5 110808070751Z
- 6 210706070751Z0n1VT0 ACKETXUEOT ACKDC3 STXTR1 S10
- 7 ACKETXUEOTBSFFACKANKARA1SI0
- ACKETXUEOT BEL FF ACKANKARA1 FF 0
- 9 ACKIETXUEOT
- 10 DECUXEGO1 CANO SYNACKEDXUEOD VICESTEGO BILGI ISLEM1 NAKO DESACKEDXUEOD COX CERT \* . EGO . GOV . TRO , SOH "O
- 11 ACK \*†H†÷
- 12 SOH SOH SOH ENONUL ETX, SOH SI NUL 0, SOH
- 13 STX, SONSONNUT; ceè`iv^ÑÔÏóSTB¤USâ˶STBËÃ",,Š%äîÈMNUTXE(ANp¬RS6¢ÄcBST°>³Ò]ÕçI\*ü@-1ß\$)§"¬(SuÙSTX«Y5)



#### Base64

TWFulGlzIGRpc3Rpbmd1aXNoZWQsIG5vdCBvbmx5IGJ5IGhpcyByZWFzb24sIGJ1dCBieSB0aGlzINNpbmd1bGFyIHBhc3Npb24gZnJvbSBvdGhlciBhbmltYWxzLCB3aGljaCBpcyBhIGx1c3Qgb2YgdGhlIG1pbmQsIHRoYXQgYnkgYSBwZXJzZXZlcmFuY2Ugb2YgZGVsaWdodCBpbiB0aGUgY29udGludWklGFuZCBpbmRlZmF0aWdhYmxlIGdlbmVyYXRpb24gb2Yga25vd2xlZGdlLCBleGNlZWRzIHRoZSBzaG9ydCB2ZWhlbWVuY2Ugb2YgYW55IGNhcm5hbCBwbGVhc3VyZ34=

Text content	М		а	n
ASCII	77	!	97	110
Bit pattern	0 1 0 0 1 1	0 1 0 1 1 0	00010	101110
Index	19	22	5	46
Base64-encoded	T	W	F	u

As this example illustrates, Base64 encoding converts 3 octets into 4 encoded characters.

http://www.fourmilab.ch/webtools/base64/

- Certificate Authority
- Server side SSL
  - HTTP server
  - FTPS server (not SFTP)
  - TN3270 server
- S/MIME email certificate
- Client certificate
- Code Signing / Timestamping

#### Roles of certificates

(identity, server, security & authentication)

- Certificate Authority
  - Sign certificates
  - Sign CRLs / OCSP requests
- Server side certificates
  - Emphasis on DNS matching
  - Either Common Name (CN)
    - Or Subject Alternative Name (SAN)
- Client side certificates
  - Typically relies on Trust and Date only

#### How is a certificate associated with something

#### External packaging:

- Certificate label
- Certificate alias
- Key ring either by certificate label or default

#### Internal property of certificate:


- Certificate Serial number
- Certificate Distinguished Name (DN)


#### What are all the fields


- Object Identifiers
  - OID Repositorywww.oid-info.com


- OIDs
  - Well known OIDs
  - Less well know OIDs
    - Show up as string of numbers...

















Appears as OID number in Windows XP









OID: 
| Spoint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization (1) symantec(113733) pki(1) extensions(6)} | Country/840/1/113733/1/6 | (ASN.1 notation) (dot notation) (OID-IRI notation)


**Description**: VeriSign defined certificate extension sub tree

#### DumpASN1 output


```
806
      48:
                  SEQUENCE {
808
                    OBJECT IDENTIFIER
      10:
                       verisignOnsiteJurisdictionHash (2 16 840 1 113733 1 6 11)
820
                    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
      34:
                       IA5String '57b72cafdc7db03de21761e541d8ba27'
822
      32:
856
      18:
                  SEQUENCE {
858
      10:
                    OBJECT IDENTIFIER
                       Unknown Verisign VPN extension (2 16 840 1 113733 (1 6 13)
870
                    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
       4:
                       BIT STRING 3 unused bits
872
       2:
                         '10000'B (bit 4)
```







On the face of it, it looks perfectly normal, Or does it?




#### Address lookup

```
canonical name ras.bankofengland.co.uk.
aliases
addresses 62.6.234.73
```

#### **Domain Whois record**

Queried whois.nic.uk with "bankofengland.co.uk"...

United Kingdom



#### **Network Whois record**

Queried whois.ripe.net with "-B 193.129.26.105"...


% Information related to '193.129.26.0 - 193.129.26.255'

inetnum: 193.129.26.0 - 193.129.26.255

netname: UU-193-129-26-D7 descr: Bank of England

descr: London, gb

country: GB



Certificate issued in error from TÜRK TRUST – interesting example, let's take a closer look...

```
Distinguished Name (DN)
                                                                                                                                               23
                                                                               Certificate
                                                                                          Details Certification Path
                                                                                  General
239 110:
               SEQUENCE {
                 SET {
241 11:
243
      9:
                   SEQUENCE {
                                                                                  Show:
                                                                                          <All>
245
      3:
                     OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6)
250
       2:
                     PrintableString 'TR'
                                                                                    Field
                                                                                      Valid from
                                                                                                                 08 August 2011 07:07:51
254
      15:
                 SET {
                                                                                       Valid to
                                                                                                                 06 July 2021 07:07:51
256
      13:
                   SEOUENCE {
258
      3:
                     OBJECT IDENTIFIER stateOrProvinceName (2 5 4 8)
                                                                                                                 *.EGO.GOV.TR, EGO BILGI IS...
                                                                                       Subject
                     UTF8String 'ANKARA'
263
      6:
                                                                                      Public key
                                                                                                                 RSA (2048 Bits)
                                                                                    Authority Key Identifier
                                                                                                                 KeyID=ab 4e 36 03 30 d2 db ...
271
                 SET {
                                                                                    Subject Key Identifier
                                                                                                                 64 fb 1b 86 3d b8 4a f2 44 82 ...
273 13:
                                                                                    Certificate Policies
                                                                                                                 [1]Certificate Policy:Policy Ide...
275
      3:
                     OBJECT IDENTIFIER localityName (2 5 4 7)
                                                                                    CRI Distribution Points
                                                                                                                 [1]CRI Distribution Point Distr
280
       6:
                     UTF8String 'ANKARA'
                                                                                   CN = *.EGO.GOV.TR
288 12:
                 SET {
                                                                                   OU = EGO BILGI ISLEM
290 10:
                   SEQUENCE {
                                                                                   O = EGO
292
     3:
                     OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10)
                                                                                   L = ANKARA
297
       3:
                     UTF8String 'EGO'
                                                                                   S = ANKARA
                                                                                   C = TR
302
      24:
                 SET {
                     OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11)
306
      3:
                     UTF8String 'EGO BILGI ISLEM
311
     15:
                                                                                                                                  Copy to File...
                                                                                                              Edit Properties...
                                                                                  Learn more about certificate details
328
      21:
                 SET {
330 19:
                   SEQUENCE {
                     OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
337
                     UTF8String '*.EGO.GOV.TR'
                                                                                                                                           OK
```

```
717
     14:
                  SEQUENCE {
719
      3:
                    OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
                    BOOLEAN TRUE
727
                    OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
729
       2:
                      BIT STRING 1 unused bit
                        '1100000'B
```

#### keyUsage

Key Usage	Certificate Signing, Off-line CR	
Basic Constraints	Subject Type=CA, Path Lengt	
Thumboriot algorithm	sha1	Ψ.

Certificate Signing, Off-line CRL Signing, CRL Signing (06)

```
AIA
                       110:
authority Info Access
```

```
1027
       40:
1029
        8:
1039
       28:
```

896 170:


909 157:


8:

```
SEQUENCE
  OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityInfoAccess (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1)
 OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
   SEOUENCE {
     SEQUENCE
       OBJECT IDENTIFIER calssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2)
          'http://www.turktrust.com.tr/sertifikalar/TURKTRU'
          'ST_Elektronik_Sunucu_Sertifikasi_Hizmetleri_s2.c'
     SEQUENCE {
       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ocsp (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1)
       [6] 'http://ocsp.turktrust.com.tr'
```



Oops – looks like someone else has also noticed it can be used as a Certificate Authority and used to issue trusted certificates...





It's worth mentioning that when the *certificate* has a subject alternative domain name specified, as in this example, the *browser* doesn't check the Subject's Common Name.

www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2818.txt

### subjectAltName

DNS Name=\*.google.com
DNS Name=\*.android.com

DNS Name=\*.appengine.google.com

DNS Name=\*.cloud.google.com

DNS Name=\*.google-analytics.com

DNS Name=\*.google.ca DNS Name=\*.google.cl

DNS Name=\*.google.co.in

DNS Name=\*.google.co.jp

DNS Name=\*.google.co.uk

DNS Name=\*.google.com.ar

DNS Name=\*.google.com.au

DNS Name=\*.google.com.br

DNS Name=\*.google.com.co

DNS Name=\*.google.com.mx

DNS Name=\*.google.com.tr

DNS Name=\*.google.com.vn

DNS Name=\*.google.de

DNS Name=\*.google.es

DNS Name=\*.google.fr

DNS Name=\*.google.hu

DNS Name=\*.google.it

DNS Name=\*.google.nl

DNS Name=\*.google.pl

DNS Name=\*.google.pt

DNS Name=\*.googleapis.cn

DNS Name=\*.googlecommerce.com

DNS Name=\*.gstatic.com

DNS Name=\*.urchin.com

DNS Name=\*.url.google.com

DNS Name=\*.youtube-nocookie.com

DNS Name=\*.youtube.com

DNS Name=\*.ytimg.com

DNS Name=android.com

DNS Name=g.co

DNS Name=goo.gl

DNS Name=google-analytics.com


DNS Name=google.com


DNS Name=googlecommerce.com


DNS Name=urchin.com


DNS Name=youtu.be

DNS Name=youtube.com











## Examples

Really useful online certificate tools

https://ssltools.icns.com.au/



## Examples




SSL Debug output

show/hide details

# How are they managed with RACF

RACDCERT commands



SETROPTS REFRESH RACLIST(DIGTCERT, DIGTRING)

## How are they managed with RACF

- RLIST DIGTCERT \*
- RLIST DIGTRING \*
- SR CLASS(DIGTCERT)
- SR CLASS(DIGTRING)
- RACDCERT ID(USER) LIST
- RACDCERT CERTAUTH LIST

Limited use as cannot be 'filtered'

# Problem solving techniques

- Make sure keyring looks correct!
- OpenSSL especially for Server side SSL
  - <a href="https://ssltools.icns.com.au/">https://ssltools.icns.com.au/</a> (online OpenSSL)
- Firefox why and how
- Notepad++

## OpenSSL

#### Sample commands:

```
openssl.exe s_client -connect host:1414 -CAfile mq-roots.cer -state -verify 1 -tls1 -cipher NULL openssl.exe s_client -connect host:1414 -CAfile mq-roots.cer -state -verify 1 -ss13 -cipher NULL openssl.exe s_client -connect host:1414 -CAfile mq-roots.cer -state -verify 1 -tls1
```

#### SSL-Session:

Protocol : TLSv1 Cipher : NULL-SHA

#### SSL-Session:


Protocol : SSLv3 Cipher : NULL-SHA

#### SSL-Session:

Protocol : TLSv1 Cipher : RC4-SHA




## Firefox





## **Firefox**



# Significance of NULL

## SSL v3.0 cipher suites

SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 SSL_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA	NULL-MD5 NULL-SHA
SSL_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5	EXP-RC4-MD5
SSL_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	DES-CBC-SHA
SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5	RC4-MD5
SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA	RC4-SHA
SSL_RSA_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHA	IDEA-CBC-SHA
SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	DES-CBC3-SHA

http://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html#CIPHER\_SUITE\_NAMES

## First thing, make sure you know what it should look like when done

READY

RACDCERT ID(TCPIP) LISTRING(TNRING)

Digital ring information for user TCPIP:

Ring:

>TNRING<

Certificate Label Name	Cert Owner	USAGE	DEFAULT
ROOT	CERTAUTH	CERTAUTH	NO
TN3270	ID(TCPIP)	PERSONAL	YES

READY

#### Generate new certificate

```
RACDCERT ID(TCPIP) +
 GENCERT +
 SUBJECTSDN(CN('common.name') +  Max length = 64
            OU('Organisational Unit') +
             O('Organisation') +
             L('Location') +
            SP('State Province') +
             C('Country')) +
 SIZE(2048) +
 NOTBEFORE (DATE (2013-02-06)) +
 NOTAFTER(DATE(2015-02-06)) +
 WITHLABEL('TN3270') +
                                            Max length = 32
 SIGNWITH(CERTAUTH LABEL('ROOT')) +
 KEYUSAGE(HANDSHAKE, DATAENCRYPT) +
 ALTNAME(EMAIL('geek@common.name') +
         URI('https://common.name') +
         DOMAIN('common.name') +
         IP(192.168.0.1))
/*
```

#### **CONNECT** example

```
/*
RACDCERT ID(TCPIP) +
ADD('HLQ.TCPIP.NEW') +
TRUST +
WITHLABEL('TN3270') +
PASSWORD('*******')
/*
```

#### READY

```
RACDCERT ID(USERID) ADD('HLQ.CERT') WITHLABEL('test import')
IRRD103I An error was encountered processing the specified input data set.
READY
```

ADD gotchas - input dataset must be allocated as VB in order to avoid

Base64 specification always has maximum line length.

If file has come from a Unix system and only has LF instead of CR/LF then


RACF will fail to process the data as max line length will have been exceeded.

## More gotchas

- If 'withlabel' parameter is omitted from RACDCERT command, it defaults to:
  - LABEL000000001
  - LABEL000000002 etc.

 Certificates are 'owned' by ID – deleting the owning ID automatically deletes ALL certificates owned by that ID!

# SMPE Example



## SMPE Example

```
READY
RACDCERT ID(*****) LISTRING(SMPERING)
Digital ring information for user *****:
 Ring:
      >SMPERING<
 Certificate Label Name
                        Cert Owner
                                             USAGE
                                                       DEFAULT
 Equifax Secure CA
                                CERTAUTH
                                             CERTAUTH
                                                         NO
                                ID(*****) CERTAUTH
 SMPE CLIENT CERT 2012
                                                         NO
```

READY

https://www14.software.ibm.com/webapp/ShopzSeries/ShopzSeries.jsp

## Discuss code from racf.co.uk

RACF119 List every certificate in RACF

RACF133 Export every certificate in RACF

• RACF109 Search for certificates in RACF

RACF109 is a search engine like search which searches serial number, common name\* certificate owner and certificate label.

\* Remember RACF unload uses CN of issuer, not the actual CN of the certificate!

## **Tools**

Base64 <a href="http://www.fourmilab.ch/webtools/base64/">http://www.fourmilab.ch/webtools/base64/</a>

Certmgr.msc Microsoft Windows

DumpASN1 <a href="http://www.nigelpentland.co.uk/dumpasn1/">http://www.nigelpentland.co.uk/dumpasn1/</a>

Firefox <a href="http://www.mozilla.org/en-US/">http://www.mozilla.org/en-US/</a>

Notepad++ <a href="http://notepad-plus-plus.org/">http://notepad-plus-plus.org/</a>

OpenSSL <a href="http://slproweb.com/products/Win32OpenSSL.html">http://slproweb.com/products/Win32OpenSSL.html</a>

Portecle <a href="http://portecle.sourceforge.net/">http://portecle.sourceforge.net/</a>

RACF PC Utilities <a href="http://www.racf.co.uk/">http://www.racf.co.uk/</a>







# Digital Certificates Principles of operation

Nigel Pentland National Australia Group